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About This Report 
 
 This report was produced at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for 
Economic Development (UWMCED), a unit of the College of Letters and Science at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The College established UWMCED in 1990, with 
the assistance of a grant from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic 
Development Administration’s “University Center” program, to provide university 
research and technical assistance to community organizations and units of government 
working to improve the Greater Milwaukee economy. In 2000, UWMCED also became 
part of UWM’s “Milwaukee Idea,” as one of the core units of the “Consortium for 
Economic Opportunity.” The analysis and conclusions presented in this report are solely 
those of UWMCED and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of UW-
Milwaukee or the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 The author of this report is Dr. Marc V. Levine, director of UWMCED. Chieko 
Maene, a graduate assistant at the Center, provided extraordinarily diligent and timely 
research assistance.  
 UWMCED strongly believes that informed public debate is vital to the 
development of good public policy. The Center publishes briefing papers, detailed 
analyses of economic trends and policies, and “technical assistance” reports on issues of 
applied economic development. In these ways, as well as in conferences and public 
lectures sponsored by the Center, we hope to contribute to public discussion of economic 
development policy in Southeastern Wisconsin. 
 Further information about the Center and its reports and activities is available at 
our web site: www.ced.uwm.edu 
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Executive Summary 
 
Milwaukee’s inner city has experienced a grim thirty-year period of economic 
decline since 1970. Despite the national economic boom of the 1990s, and some 
misleading research purporting to show a Milwaukee inner city economy “rich with 
opportunity,” the problems of poverty, joblessness, and slowing business activity 
persisted through the 1990s.  At the beginning of the 21st century, a cluster of daunting 
issues face policymakers seeking strategies to revive Milwaukee’s inner city 
neighborhoods and improve economic opportunities for residents: 
Demographic Decline: During the 1990s alone, the population in the city’s 
“Enterprise Community” dropped by 24 percent. Between 1970-2000, it fell by 45.2 
percent. In the 1990s, every single City of Milwaukee “NSP Area” experienced a decline 
in population; 
Unemployment and Labor Market Exclusion: Manufacturing employed around 
41 percent of inner city workers in 1970; by 2000, only 19 percent held industrial jobs. 
The inner city labor market has not recovered from this deindustrialization, and 
unemployment in the inner city in 2000 was four times the metro Milwaukee average. In 
the city’s “Enterprise Community,” 59 percent of the working age population was either 
unemployed or not in the labor force, twice the suburban average. In the census tracts 
around 27th Street and North Avenue –an important inner city redevelopment zone—54.9 
percent of prime working age males (ages 25-54) were either unemployed or not in the 
labor force in 2000. 
Poverty:  The poverty rate in the city’s “Enterprise Community” was 44.3 percent 
in 1999 (down from 57.1 percent in 1989, but higher than the rate twenty years ago). In 
neighborhoods such as King Drive, the poverty rate was 50 percent in 1999, five times the 
metro area average. Although poverty rates declined in inner city neighborhoods during 
the 1990s, this was due mainly to a massive out-migration of poor residents (and some 
gentrification). Many of these poor residents apparently moved to neighborhoods such as 
the Northwest Side and Lincoln Park, where poverty (as well as unemployment and labor 
market exclusion) increased in the 1990s. There was a spatial “rearranging” of poverty in 
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Milwaukee in the 1990s, rather than a meaningful reduction in poverty rates (the city-
wide poverty rate declined only slightly, from 22.1 to 21.3 during the 1990s). 
Income: Real median household income in the city’s “Enterprise Community” 
fell 13.7 percent between 1979-99; by 1999, the income of the median inner city 
household in Milwaukee was less than 40 percent of the metro area median, and less than 
30 percent of the median household in the suburbs. Real household income did increase 
during the 1990s in many inner city neighborhoods (such as King Drive) but again, 
mainly because of massive out-migration by poor households (and a smattering of 
gentrification). In other neighborhoods, such as the Northwest Side, incomes fell sharply 
in the 1990s as the number of poor residents increased and middle-class residents shrank. 
Consequently, real median household income for the city as a whole rose by only 1.5 
percent during the “roaring 1990s” (compared to 12.1 percent growth in the suburbs).  
Stagnant Economic Activity: At the peak of the national economic boom 
(between 1994-1999), the number of business establishments fell by 9.1 percent in 
Milwaukee’s inner city, and the number of retail establishments declined by 14.0 percent. 
Other indicators, such as employment and annual payroll, registered very modest gains in 
the inner city during the late 1990s, but still lagged far behind the growth in business 
activity in the suburbs. City officials in Milwaukee tout the “competitive advantages” of 
the inner city, flowing from density and greater “purchasing power” than suburban 
communities. But, inner city purchasing power (measured by aggregate household 
income) has declined precipitously since the 1970s, while suburban income has 
skyrocketed. On every indicator of economic activity examined in this report, the gap 
between the inner city and Milwaukee’s suburbs widened significantly in the late 1990s.   
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I.  
Introduction 
  
 There is little disagreement among serious urban researchers across the United States 
that the “inner cities” of urban America are in profound economic distress. William Julius 
Wilson, the distinguished Harvard sociologist, has written of “unprecedented” levels of 
joblessness in inner city neighborhoods, and the social consequences of “when work 
disappears.”1 Paul Jargowsky has documented the growth in concentrated poverty, and in 
“the number of ghettos, barrios, and slums in the United States” since the 1970.2 As 
Jargowsky has written: “Every large city in the United States, whether economically 
vibrant or withering, has areas of extreme poverty, physical decay, and increasing 
abandonment. Most city residents will go to great lengths to avoid living, working, or 
even driving through these areas.”3 
 In Milwaukee, by contrast, the rhetoric of city officials has been to dismiss such 
characterizations of the inner city as “urban legends.” As one researcher, partially funded 
by the city, put it: “This [the inner city] is an area where there are rich opportunities. You 
have this myth that people don’t work there and it’s not a place to do business.”4 A series 
of recent reports, for example, have sought to dispel “urban myths” about the “economic 
well-being” of Milwaukee’s inner city, highlighting the “hidden assets” and “untapped 
purchasing power” of these neighborhoods.5 These reports have even compared inner city 
income patterns favorably to trends in the suburbs, and argued that the more densely 
populated inner city offers a “competitive advantage” for business growth.  A Milwaukee 
                                                 
1 William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1996). 
2 Paul Jargowsky, Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City (New York: The Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1997). 
3 Ibid., p. 1. 
4 Cited in Joel Dresang, “Heart of city beats with opportunity,” The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, 16 
January 2000.  
5 See UWM Employment and Training Institute, The Milwaukee Neighborhood Indicators/Asset Mapping 
Project: Employment and Income Growth in Central City Milwaukee Neighborhoods; John Pawasarat and 
Lois Quinn, “Exposing Urban Legends: The Real Purchasing Power of Central City Neighborhoods,” 
Brookings Institution, June 2001. We should note that we have yet to find a single scholarly analysis 
claiming that “no one works in inner city neighborhoods,” one of the “urban legends” that the ETI/City of 
Milwaukee studies seek to “expose.” This is simply a strawman. 
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Journal-Sentinel newspaper headline in 2000 perfectly captured the spin of city officials 
and the positive tone of these recent reports: “Heart of city beats with opportunity.”6  
 However, the most comprehensive and recent data available are at odds with this 
boosterish perspective. Despite the national economic boom of the 1990s –which brought 
considerable prosperity to the Milwaukee region7-- poverty and unemployment remain 
stubbornly high in the inner city. Despite the misleading analyses presented on inner city 
“purchasing power” as the potential linchpin of economic revival, aggregate income and 
business activity in inner city neighborhoods continued to fall further and further behind 
Milwaukee’s thriving suburbs. Most dramatically, the 1990s brought a new wave of 
demographic “hollowing out” in the inner city, in which thousands of residents left these 
neighborhoods –hardly a sign of economic vitality. Even in areas explicitly touted by the 
city as examples of an inner city “renaissance” – the commercial districts along King 
Drive and around 27th Street and North Avenue—economic indicators reveal astonishing 
levels of economic distress. Finally, signs were unmistakable that the inner city 
conditions were spreading to other city neighborhoods; in the 1990s, for example, 
incomes fell and poverty and unemployment rose sharply on the city’s Northwest Side.  
 This report, drawing on the most recent data from the decennial U.S. Census and 
County Business Patterns, offers a long-term perspective on the economic health of 
Milwaukee’s inner city, tracing trends in income, poverty, and employment since the 
1970s. It is in this longer historical perspective that we can gain a clearer sense of the 
economic trajectory of Milwaukee’s inner city neighborhoods. Effective economic 
revitalization policies depend on an accurate appraisal of neighborhood economic 
conditions. The goal in this report to provide such an appraisal, so that policymakers and 
citizens may better understand the nature of the challenges facing Milwaukee’s inner city, 
and assess how well current policies are meeting those challenges. Ultimately, the 
purpose of this report is to permit policymakers and citizens to assess where we’ve been, 
where we are currently, and where we may be headed.  
 Before we present the data, for the purposes of clarity, let us define terms. This report 
uses the term “inner city” to refer to Milwaukee’s neighborhoods in which, historically, 
                                                 
6 Dresang, op. cit. 
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economic conditions have trailed the rest of the city and region.8  We present data for 
these neighborhoods in four main ways. First, we present data on economic trends since 
1970 in the 35 census tracts designated by the City of Milwaukee in 1994 as part of the 
city’s “Enterprise Community” – effectively, for the purposes of receiving federal aid, 
these were the tracts designated as Milwaukee’s “inner city.” Second, we present data 
since 1970 on the 17 neighborhoods designated, again by the City of Milwaukee, as 
“Neighborhood Strategic Planning Areas,” the core neighborhoods around which the city 
orients its community development block grant activity. Third, we examine census tracts 
along three commercial corridors of the city –the King Drive area, the 27th and North 
area, and the Fond du Lac Avenue corridor-- to more clearly examine whether the 
presumed advantages of “aggregate purchasing power” in the inner city are showing up 
in indicators of neighborhood socio-economic health. Finally, for data on economic 
trends in the 1990s –such as the number of businesses or retail trade establishments—we 
use “zip code” designations of city neighborhoods (because this data, extracted from 
County Business Patterns, is not available at the census tract level). The zip codes we use 
for the inner city in these tables are precisely the ones utilized in the ETI studies and City 
of Milwaukee presentations on the “economic well-being of the central city.” [These zip 
codes, as well as the precise census tracts making up each neighborhood analyzed in this 
report, can be found in the appendix].  
 
II.  
The Hollowing-Out of Milwaukees Inner City 
 It is often claimed that “demography is destiny,” and while that may not be literally 
true for neighborhoods, population trends are an important indicator of neighborhood 
economic dynamism. Population decline often goes hand in hand with economic distress; 
conversely, population growth is strongly associated with a thriving economy. Population 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See the Center for Economic Development report, Metropolitan Polarization in an Era of Affluence: 
Income Trends in Metropolitan Milwaukee During the 1990s (Milwaukee: CED, January 2002). 
8 Sometimes, the label “central city” is used to describe these neighborhoods, as in the ETI reports and 
often in newspaper reports. But, since the Census Bureau defines “central city” as the (entire) city (as 
opposed to suburbs or metropolitan areas), most scholars use the label of “inner city” or “ghetto” to 
describe the troubled neighborhoods of the “urban core.” We shall follow the more accepted usage here, 
and refer to the neighborhoods of Milwaukee’s “inner city.” 
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loss means shrinking consumer markets and a smaller pool of employable workers –
factors that contribute to economic stagnation. Moreover, in a devastating downward 
spiral, economic decline and associated social problems then induce more residents to 
leave a neighborhood in search of economic opportunity and better neighborhood 
conditions, and discourage others from moving into the neighborhood.  This, in turn, 
promotes further population decline and economic distress. 
 Population trends since the 1970s have reflected essentially a demographic 
“hollowing-out” of Milwaukee’s inner city, a massive movement of residents out of 
neighborhoods in the heart of the city. Since 1970, the neighborhoods comprising the 
City’s currently designated “Enterprise Community” have lost 45.2 percent of their 
residents. The census tracts around King Drive and 27th and North Avenue, on 
Milwaukee’s North Side, contain half the number of residents and families in 2000 that 
they did in 1970. As Tables 1-6 illustrate, the bulk of the exodus from Milwaukee’s inner 
city has occurred in two waves: in the 1970s and in the 1990s. Despite the programs 
associated with the designation of the city’s “Enterprise Community” in the 1990s –as 
well as highly touted “market-driven” redevelopment projects along King Drive and the 
27th and North Avenue community—these areas lost between 22.3 percent and 30.3 
percent of their entire population during the 1990s. Of Milwaukee’s 17 “Neighborhood 
Strategic Planning Areas,” all but three experienced steep population declines during the 
1990s, with seven “NSP” areas losing 20 percent of their population during the decade 
alone (and over 40 percent of their residents since 1970). In short, if the “heart of the 
city” was beating with opportunity in the 1990s, residents were missing the message and 
“voting with their feet” by exiting the inner city in droves.9 
 Where did these inner city outmigrants go? We know, given persistent segregation in 
metropolitan Milwaukee, that very few moved to the suburbs. As Table 1 shows, the 
Northwest Side –including census tracts on the far northwest part of the city—witnessed 
a substantial increase in population between 1970-2000 (including a solid gain in the 
1990s). Given the economic changes on the Northwest Side we examine later, it seems 
clear that many of the poorer residents who exited the traditional “inner core” in  
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Table 1: 
The Demographic Hollowing-Out of the Inner City I: Fewer People 
 
Population Change in Selected Inner City Neighborhoods Since 1970 
 
Neighborhood % change 
1970-1980 
 
% change 
1980-1990 
% change 
1990-2000 
% change 
1970-2000 
City of Milwaukee 
Enterprise Community 
-24.3 -4.8 -24.0 -45.2
Fond du Lac Corridor -8.6 -1.8 -13.5 -22.4
King Drive District -36.2 -4.9 -22.3 -52.8
27th and North Area -20.2 -9.3 -30.3 -49.6
Northwest Side (extended) +11.6 +4.6 +4.1 +21.5
City (entire) -11.3 -1.3 -5.0 -16.8
 
Table 2: 
The Demographic Hollowing-Out of the Inner City II: Fewer People 
 
Population Change in City of Milwaukee NSP Areas Since 1970 
 
NSP 
# 
 Neighborhood 
 
% change 
1970-1980 
% change 
1980-1990 
% change 
1990-2000 
% change 
1970-2000 
 
1 Parklawn -6.3 +1.7 -10.1 -14.3
2 Northwest -7.6 +3.8 -0.9 -5.1
3 Lincoln Park -14.0 -4.4 -5.8 -22.5
4 United Community -9.6 -6.8 -17.9 -30.9
5 Sherman Park -5.9 +5.0 -0.6 -1.8
6 Harambee -24.0 -5.2 -20.0 -42.4
7 Riverwest -20.0 +2.3 -9.8 -26.2
8 Metcalfe Park -9.5 -3.2 -24.6 -34.0
9 Midtown -18.2 -11.9 -31.3 -50.5
10 Waico/YMCA -33.9 -12.2 -25.3 -56.6
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill -15.1 +7.7 -20.6 -27.4
12 Mid-Town -25.0 -6.3 -25.6 -47.7
13 Hillside/Lapham -9.0 -0.1 -34.1 -40.1
14 West Side -18.3 +6.5 -17.1 -27.8
15 Greater Clarke Square -12.3 +5.1 +10.8 +2.1
16 Near South Side -11.0 +11.1 +1.8 +0.6
17 Historic South Side -15.9 +3.3 +7.6 -6.6
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Another possibility, of course, is that many low-income residents were “encouraged” to move out of inner 
city neighborhoods, as pockets of gentrification developed in the “Enterprise Community” (i.e. especially 
in areas such as Brewers Hill and Walkers Point). We will return to this possibility later in this report. 
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Milwaukee moved to the northwest. Finally, many inner city residents apparently left 
Milwaukee entirely during the 1990s, although we cannot pinpoint their destinations until 
more refined census data on migration becomes available in 2003.  
 But, whatever the destination of inner city outmigrants, the conclusion is 
unavoidable: Milwaukee’s inner city has undergone an extraordinary depopulation over 
the past thirty years, with massive demographic declines continuing in the 1990s. No 
matter the measure we use –total population, number of families, or number of 
households—the finding is the same: a massive demographic abandonment of the inner 
city. This is hardly a positive sign for the economic vitality of inner city neighborhoods. 
 
 
Table 3: 
 The Demographic Hollowing-Out of the Inner City III: Fewer Families 
Change in the Number of Families Living in Selected  
Inner City Neighborhoods Since 1970 
 
Neighborhood % change 
1970-1980 
 
% change 
1980-1990 
% change 
1990-2000 
% change 
1970-2000 
City of Milwaukee 
Enterprise Community 
-21.1 -8.1 -26.4 -46.7
Fond du Lac Corridor -11.9 -4.8 -15.0 -28.7
King Drive District -32.1 -2.9 -22.1 -48.7
27th and North Area -17.8 -13.7 -30.5 -50.7
Northwest Side (extended) +18.1 +1.4 -2.0 +17.4
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Table 4: 
The Demographic Hollowing-Out of the Inner City IV: 
Change in the Number of Families Living in City of Milwaukee NSP Areas Since 1970 
 
NSP 
# 
 Neighborhood 
 
% change 
1970-1980 
% change 
1980-1990 
% change 
1990-2000 
% change 
1970-2000 
 
1 Parklawn -8.7 -0.3 -17.3 -24.8 
2 Northwest -12.5 +1.9 -4.1 -14.5 
3 Lincoln Park -14.6 -3.2 -10.2 -25.8 
4 United Community -7.8 -6.2 -18.7 -29.8 
5 Sherman Park -12.9 -2.2 -3.2 -1.8 
6 Harambee -22.1 -3.7 -22.4 -41.8 
7 Riverwest -28.0 -3.5 -16.9 -42.2 
8 Metcalfe Park -8.5 -8.5 -28.3 -40.0 
9 Midtown -15.2 -10.4 -34.0 -49.8 
10 Waico/YMCA -31.6 -13.6 -26.8 -56.6 
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill -15.8 -1.5 -21.8 -35.2 
12 Mid-Town -22.7 -6.6 -25.4 -46.1 
13 Hillside/Lapham -6.7 +1.3 -36.8 -40.2 
14 West Side -28.8 +8.2 -17.9 -36.8 
15 Greater Clarke Square -10.5 -1.4 -1.2 -12.7 
16 Near South Side -5.4 -1.0 -7.9 -13.8 
17 Historic South Side -15.9 -0.5 -3.3 -19.1 
 
 
 
Table 5:  
The Demographic Hollowing-Out of the Inner City V: Fewer Households 
Change in the Number of Households Living in Selected  
Inner City Neighborhoods Since 1980 
 
Neighborhood % change 
1980-1990 
% change 
1990-2000 
% change 
1970-2000 
City of Milwaukee 
Enterprise Community 
-10.3 -20.7 -28.9 
Fond du Lac Corridor -7.4 -11.5 -18.1 
King Drive District -7.2 -22.0 -27.6 
27th and North Area -17.1 -26.4 -39.0 
Northwest Side (extended) +9.5 +0.8 +10.3 
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Table 6: 
The Demographic Hollowing-Out of the Inner City VI: Fewer Households 
Change in the Number of Households Living in City of Milwaukee NSP Areas Since 1980 
 
NSP 
# 
 Neighborhood 
 
% change 
1980-1990 
% change 
1990-2000 
% change 
1970-2000 
 
1 Parklawn -5.1 -10.2 -14.8
2 Northwest -1.5 -5.0 -6.4
3 Lincoln Park +0.1 -5.0 -4.9
4 United Community -5.8 -9.8 -15.0
5 Sherman Park -2.7 -3.8 -6.4
6 Harambee -6.2 -15.8 -21.1
7 Riverwest +0.7 -5.8 -5.2
8 Metcalfe Park -13.6 -22.6 -32.6
9 Midtown -14.2 -26.9 -37.3
10 Waico/YMCA -17.2 -19.5 -26.4
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill -11.9 -21.5 -30.9
12 Mid-Town -8.6 -19.5 -33.3
13 Hillside/Lapham +7.9 -27.5 -21.7
14 West Side -8.1 -12.3 -19.4
15 Greater Clarke Square -0.3 -5.1 -5.4
16 Near South Side -1.7 -7.3 -8.9
17 Historic South Side -0.5 -3.3 -0.1
 
 
III.  
 
When Work Disappears: Milwaukees Inner City Labor Market Since 1970 
 
 As William Julius Wilson has noted in his pathbreaking work on the inner city, 
“current levels of joblessness in some neighborhoods are unprecedented…For the first 
time in the twentieth century, most adults in many inner city ghetto neighborhoods are 
not working in a typical week.”10 The impact of joblessness on inner city neighborhoods, 
as Wilson explains, is profound: 
The consequences of high neighborhood joblessness are more devastating 
that those of high neighborhood poverty. A neighborhood in which people 
are poor but employed is different from a neighborhood in which people 
are poor and jobless. Many of today’s problems in the inner-city ghetto 
                                                 
10 Wilson, When Work Disappears, p. xiii.  
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neighborhoods—crime, family dissolution, welfare, low levels of social 
organization, and so on—are fundamentally a consequence of the 
disappearance of work.11 
 
 Since the 1970s, Milwaukee’s inner city neighborhoods have witnessed a 
staggering growth in the proportion of residents who are “poor and jobless.” As Table 7 
shows, official rates of unemployment tripled in the neighborhoods comprising the City 
of Milwaukee’s “Enterprise Community” between 1970-2000. By the 1990s, official 
unemployment rates exceeded 20 percent in the most troubled neighborhoods of the inner 
city (see Tables 7 and 8). The 1980s were a particularly devastating decade for inner city 
labor markets; in the census tracts around 27th Street and North Avenue, for example, 
unemployment reached 31.2 percent in 1990. 
During the 1990s, there was some improvement in the unemployment situation in 
most inner city neighborhoods, although rates remained stubbornly high. In the city’s 
“Enterprise Community,” for example unemployment rates dropped from 27.8 percent to 
22.2 percent during the “boom” decade. Unemployment declined in the census tracts 
around 27th and North from 31.2 to 22.3 percent between 1990-2000.  
These improvements, however, may be less meaningful than they appear. First, 
the 2000 unemployment rate the “Enterprise Community,” for example, was over four 
times the metro Milwaukee unemployment rate; by contrast, in 1980 it was about 2.5 
times greater than the metro area average. Thus, the unemployment gap separating the 
inner city from the rest of the regional economy remains much greater than twenty years 
ago. Whatever modest gains occurred in the 1990s, they were insufficient to bring the 
unemployment situation in the inner city back to even conditions of 1980. 
Second, in a finding we will see repeated on a number of indicators, economic 
distress in the 1990s –this time in the form of unemployment—grew markedly in 
Milwaukee’s Northwest Side neighborhoods (see Table 7), as well as in neighborhoods 
such as Lincoln Park and Sherman Park (see Table 8). Overall, during the great national 
economic boom of the 1990s, the city of Milwaukee’s unemployment rate rose from 8.9 
percent to 9.4 percent. In short, rather than representing any genuine gains in the inner 
city labor market, the “improved” unemployment rate in many inner city neighborhoods  
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
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Table 7: 
Unemployment in Milwaukees Inner City I: 1970-2000 
% of civilian labor force unemployed in selected neighborhoods 
 
Neighborhood 1970 1980 1990 2000 
 
City of Milwaukee 
Enterprise Community 
7.8 15.7 27.8 22.2 
Fond du Lac Corridor 5.1 9.1 16.5 13.3 
King Drive District 10.6 16.8 28.0 24.9 
27th and North Area 9.0 14.1 31.2 22.3 
Northwest Side (extended) 4.0 6.3 6.9 8.5 
City of Milwaukee (entire) 4.1 6.9 8.9 9.4 
Metro Milwaukee 3.2 6.1 5.6 5.2 
 
 
Table 8: 
Unemployment in Milwaukees Inner City II: 1970-2000 
% of civilian labor force unemployed in NSP Areas  
 
NSP 
# 
 Neighborhood 
 
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 2000 
 
1 Parklawn 3.4 5.3 15.7 13.3
2 Northwest 3.7 8.4 11.8 13.6
3 Lincoln Park 2.5 9.4 8.9 13.5
4 United Community 6.7 13.4 17.1 19.3
5 Sherman Park 2.8 5.7 9.1 10.1
6 Harambee 7.4 16.3 22.2 22.0
7 Riverwest 4.5 8.1 10.8 9.1
8 Metcalfe Park 6.4 14.1 22.9 20.9
9 Midtown 9.5 16.2 30.4 21.1
10 Waico/YMCA 7.5 14.6 28.6 25.0
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 5.4 11.2 20.6 22.4
12 Mid-Town 10.4 16.0 34.1 24.9
13 Hillside/Lapham 7.6 23.8 40.8 23.2
14 West Side 5.8 10.0 15.9 15.3
15 Greater Clarke Square 5.3 6.7 9.0 13.0
16 Near South Side 4.8 10.9 16.1 13.7
17 Historic South Side 4.0 8.5 10.4 12.7
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during the 1990s simply represented a geographic “rearranging” of unemployment, with a 
slight reduction in the traditional “inner core” and sharp increases in neighborhoods to 
the north and west. Symptomatic of this trend of the “expanding inner city” was the sharp 
deterioration in the employment situation in Lincoln Park where the unemployment rate 
climbed by 50 percent during the 1990s (rising from 8.9 to 13.5 percent). 
Although the unemployment rate is a useful indicator of the labor market situation 
in inner city neighborhoods, it is flawed because it does not reveal the true extent to 
which work has disappeared from neighborhood life. For example, the unemployment 
rate does not include people who have stopped looking for work or are otherwise not in 
the civilian labor force. Thus, a better measure of the availability of work in Milwaukee’s 
inner city is the indicator known as  “labor market exclusion.” This measure calculates 
the proportion of the working age population (over 16 years old) that is either 
unemployed or not in the civilian labor force (in school, not looking for work, disabled, 
or in prison).  
As Tables 9-12 graphically illustrate, labor market exclusion has reached 
breathtaking proportions in Milwaukee’s inner city. 59.0 percent of the working age 
population in the city’s “Enterprise Community” was either unemployed or not in the 
civilian labor force in 2000. Four of the city’s “NSP” areas had exclusion rates above 60 
percent in 2000. This may not reach the status of “no one works in these neighborhoods,” 
the strawman that the ETI reports seek to “expose” as an “urban myth,” but these are 
rates of “non-work” that bespeak an inner city in deep and continuing economic crisis.  
By contrast, the labor market exclusion rate for metro Milwaukee suburbs in 2000 was 
only 29.5 percent. 
Tables 11-12 present labor market exclusion rates for males in inner city 
neighborhoods between 1970-2000. This breakdown enables us to more precisely analyze 
changes in inner city work opportunities since 1970 by controlling for increases in labor 
force participation by women that has occurred since then. The results are striking: in 
every neighborhood in the inner city, the percentage of the male working age population 
either unemployed or not in the civilian labor force has grown markedly since 1970. By 
2000, over 56 percent of the working age males in Milwaukee’s “Enterprise Community” 
were either unemployed or not in the civilian labor force. This is double the rate in the 
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metro Milwaukee suburbs. In 2000, labor market exclusion rates for males exceeded 60 
percent in three of the city’s “NSP” areas and were over 50 percent in five others. Even 
during the boom decade of the 1990s, labor market exclusion among males increased 
in12 of the city’s 17 “NSP” areas. Along King Drive and around 27th St. and North 
Avenues – the two areas most often cited by city officials as examples of successful 
redevelopment in Milwaukee’s inner city—the vast majority of working age male 
residents in 2000 were either unemployed or not in the labor force (see Table 11). 
 
Table  9: 
Labor Market Exclusion in Milwaukees Inner 
City Neighborhoods: Both Sexes 
 
(% of working age population either unemployed or not 
 in the civilian labor force, 1970-2000) 
 
Neighborhood 1970 1980 1990 2000 
 
City of Milwaukee Enterprise 
Community 
47.5 55.3 64.6 59.0 
Fond du Lac Corridor 45.7 44.4 47.0 48.5 
27th St. and North Avenue Area 48.0 53.4 65.8 61.5 
King Drive District 48.5 56.9 67.4 61.4 
Northwest Side (extended) 34.2 33.7 34.7 40.2 
City of Milwaukee (entire) 40.7 41.2 41.8 42.2 
Metro Milwaukee Suburbs 40.3 35.6 30.0 29.5 
 
 The figures on male labor market exclusion highlight not only the extent to which 
work has “disappeared” in the inner city since the 1970s, but the degree to which 
distressed inner city labor market conditions expanded geographically in Milwaukee 
during the 1990s. The percentage of working age males “not working” in neighborhoods 
such as the Northwest Side, Lincoln Park, and Sherman Park has grown in every decade 
since 1970, including the 1990s. By 2000, 48.2 percent of all working age males in 
Lincoln Park and the Northwest NSP Area--neighborhoods of stable, blue-collar, middle-
class workers in the not-too-distant past—were out of work (table 12).12  In short, 
                                                 
12 The deteriorating labor market for residents of Lincoln Park is, once again, striking. In 1970, the rate of 
male labor market exclusion among Lincoln Park residents (20.9 %) was comparable to the rate in 
Milwaukee’s suburbs (19.8 %), and lower than the rate for the city as a whole (25.5 %). By 2000, the 
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whether we look at the “traditional” inner city (neighborhoods such as Metcalfe Park or 
Harambee) or the “new” inner city (neighborhoods such as Lincoln Park or the 
Northwest), the finding is the same: by 2000, after three decades of economic decline, 
unacceptable numbers of working age males in the inner city were “not working.”  
 
TABLE 10:  
Labor Market Exclusion in Milwaukees  
NSP Areas: Both Sexes 
 
(% of working age population either unemployed or not 
in the civilian labor force, 1970-2000) 
 
 NSP # 
 
 
NEIGHBORHOOD  
 
 
1970 
 
 
1980 
 
 
1990 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1 Parklawn 43.5 43.0 48.4 45.9
2 Northwest 40.4 39.7 39.6 46.4
3 Lincoln Park 37.4 42.0 38.3 47.4
4 United Community 40.4 46.3 50.8 57.1
5 Sherman Park 43.4 39.4 36.0 39.9
6 Harambee 45.4 54.2 59.4 56.7
7 Riverwest 41.9 40.8 39.7 36.2
8 Metcalfe Park 45.1 48.5 58.3 56.8
9 Midtown 47.6 54.1 65.0 60.8
10 WAICO/YMCA 44.3 56.2 63.4 62.0
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 42.3 44.2 57.5 55.1
12 Mid-Town 52.1 56.4 66.2 62.1
13 Hillside/Lapham 65.3 70.7 81.5 63.7
14 West Side 45.0 51.4 55.0 48.9
15 Greater Clarke Square 42.8 44.1 44.2 49.7
16 Near South Side 44.5 49.8 52.4 47.9
17 Historic South Side 42.3 42.0 40.7 48.1
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lincoln Park rate (48.2 %) was double the suburban rate (24.8 %), and nine percentage points higher than 
the city average. 
 19
 
Table  11: 
Labor Market Exclusion in Milwaukees Inner 
City Neighborhoods: Males 
 
(% of working age population either unemployed or not 
in the civilian labor force, 1970-2000) 
 
Neighborhood 1970 1980 1990 2000 
 
City of Milwaukee Enterprise 
Community 
33.9 47.2 57.6 56.4 
Fond du Lac Corridor 29.6 37.0 44.1 49.4 
27th St. and North Avenue Area 33.1 45.7 60.1 61.1 
King Drive District 36.0 52.5 62.8 58.1 
Northwest Side (extended) 15.0 22.6 27.9 35.6 
City of Milwaukee (entire) 25.5 32.1 35.8 39.7 
Metro Milwaukee Suburbs 19.8 21.3 22.6 24.8 
 
Table 12: 
 
Labor Market Exclusion in Milwaukees NSP Areas: Males 
 
(% of working age population either unemployed or not  
in the civilian labor force, 1970-2000)  
 
 NSP # 
 
 
NEIGHBORHOOD  
 
 
1970 
 
 
1980 
 
 
1990 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1 Parklawn 26.2 31.0 40.5 41.2
2 Northwest 23.6 30.9 35.5 48.2
3 Lincoln Park 20.9 31.6 35.4 48.2
4 United Community 28.7 41.5 47.6 59.1
5 Sherman Park 27.4 30.2 30.7 39.0
6 Harambee 31.6 45.9 53.1 54.7
7 Riverwest 28.5 32.6 34.4 34.6
8 Metcalfe Park 30.0 40.4 51.7 57.9
9 Midtown 32.7 46.7 62.3 58.9
10 WAICO/YMCA 33.2 51.1 56.5 60.7
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 26.9 34.2 50.9 54.9
12 Mid-Town 37.1 48.7 62.3 60.7
13 Hillside/Lapham 60.6 69.7 81.6 69.1
14 West Side 39.7 45.7 50.8 49.1
15 Greater Clarke Square 26.7 30.4 35.2 44.1
16 Near South Side 29.6 38.3 42.3 38.6
17 Historic South Side 24.7 30.3 32.7 43.0
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 Table 13 offers perhaps the sharpest snapshot on the degree to which the inner 
city labor market had diverged from the rest of the Milwaukee region by 2000. This table 
attempts to control for variables that might influence rates shown in earlier tables, such as 
the number of potential workers in school or the growth of female labor force 
participation since the 1970s. Table 13 displays labor force exclusion rates among prime 
working age (between 25 to 54 years old) residents of two key inner city neighborhoods –
King Drive and 27th/North—compared to the entire city of Milwaukee as well as the 
suburban communities of metropolitan Milwaukee.  
 
Table 13: 
 
Labor Force Exclusion Among   
Prime Working Age Population in Selected  
Milwaukee Communities, 2000 
 
(% of residents ages 25-54 either unemployed or not in labor force)  
 
Place 
 
Males Both Sexes 
King Drive District 42.1 46.5 
27th Street and North Avenue Area  54.9 54.2 
City of Milwaukee 25.6 28.2 
Metro Milwaukee Suburbs 9.3 14.5 
 
 The disparity between the inner city and “mainstream” economies could hardly be 
wider. In 2000, the labor force exclusion rate among prime working age males in the 27th  
Street and North Avenue neighborhood was six times higher than the rate in the suburbs 
of Milwaukee, Waukesha, Washington, and Ozaukee counties; it was double the city-
wide rate. Over half of the prime working age males living around 27th and North were 
either unemployed or not in the labor force in 2000; 42 percent of the males living in the 
vicinity of King Drive were similarly “outside” the world of work.  
 In short, the evidence is compelling and overwhelming. Inner city Milwaukee 
remains a place where the majority of working age males do not hold jobs (tables 11-12), 
and where, in two of the city’s most touted inner city redevelopment zones, well over 40 
percent of the prime working age males are jobless. In light of these figures, it can only 
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be called a major distortion of labor market realities to characterize Milwaukee’s inner 
city, in 2000, as brimming with economic opportunity. 
 Tables 14-17 complete the portrait of an inner city labor market in Milwaukee 
where joblessness persists in 2000 as a daily reality. As has been well established by 
Wilson and others, the deindustrialization of American cities has wreaked havoc on inner 
city economic opportunity.13 Table 14 illustrates how a major factor causing the rise in 
joblessness in Milwaukee’s inner city has been the steep decline in manufacturing 
employment since the 1970s. In most inner city neighborhoods, around 40 percent of 
employed residents in 1970 worked in manufacturing, a figure that exceeded the city-
wide average (34.8 percent). In other words, to a greater extent than in other parts of 
Milwaukee, manufacturing constituted an integral part of the inner city employment base 
through the 1970s. Thus, inner city neighborhoods were disproportionately affected as 
Milwaukee deindustrialized between 1970 and 2000.  
As Tables 14 and 15 show, deindustrialization has been dramatic –and 
unrelenting—in Milwaukee’s inner city. Harambee is a typical inner city neighborhood in 
this regard, in which the percentage of employed residents working in manufacturing 
declined from 40.3 percent in 1970 to 15.8 percent in 2000. The raw figures are even 
more striking: between 1970-2000, the number of Harambee residents employed in 
manufacturing declined from 4,060 to only 765. Deindustrialization of a similar 
magnitude was registered throughout the inner city: in Metcalfe Park, for example, the 
number of residents employed in manufacturing declined from 2,949 to 496 between 
1970-2000, while in Midtown the number of industrial workers fell from 1,718 to 250. In 
the census tracts along King Drive, where an American Motors plant once operated 
barely a mile away on Capitol Drive, only 198 residents worked in manufacturing in 
2000 (down from 1,217 in 19790). Moreover, as the data on labor market exclusion 
already discussed makes abundantly clear, these lost manufacturing jobs have not been 
adequately replaced in inner city neighborhoods plagued by joblessness. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The seminal work is William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, 
and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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Table 14: 
Deindustrialization and the Inner City Labor Market: I 
(% of employed residents working in manufacturing in selected neighborhoods)  
 
Neighborhood 1970 1980 1990 2000 
 
City of Milwaukee Enterprise 
Community 
40.8 35.3 24.2 19.2 
Fond du Lac Corridor 33.9 32.4 21.9 16.1 
27th St. and North Avenue Area 40.8 32.5 24.4 18.5 
King Drive District 39.2 31.1 17.8 17.4 
Northwest Side (extended) 35.8 33.0 26.4 21.3 
City of Milwaukee (entire) 34.8 31.7 22.2 18.5 
Metro Milwaukee  35.0 31.7 24.0 20.3 
 
Table 15: 
Deindustrialization and the Inner City Labor Market: II 
(% of employed residents working in manufacturing in “NSP” Areas) 
 
 
 NSP # 
 
 Neighborhood 
 
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
1 Parklawn 33.2 32.7 24.7 21.8
2 Northwest 37.5 38.3 27.0 19.0
3 Lincoln Park 34.5 33.5 24.9 20.2
4 United Community 41.5 40.9 24.9 16.9
5 Sherman Park 28.6 29.2 20.5 17.2
6 Harambee 40.3 32.4 19.1 15.8
7 Riverwest 39.7 28.5 17.2 11.0
8 Metcalfe Park 38.7 36.2 20.6 14.0
9 Midtown 41.0 34.1 24.3 15.6
10 Waico/YMCA 38.6 35.8 22.0 16.9
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 38.0 33.9 21.8 18.1
12 Mid-Town 40.0 33.2 25.0 17.5
13 Hillside/Lapham 25.9 19.7 16.9 7.5
14 West Side 26.0 23.9 14.7 12.7
15 Greater Clarke Square 43.4 39.0 27.0 26.5
16 Near South Side 48.4 45.8 34.6 31.7
17 Historic South Side 44.0 38.7 26.4 25.6
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Table 16: 
 
When Work AND Population Disappear I: 
 
The declining number of employed residents living in 
Milwaukees Inner City Neighborhoods Since 1970 
 
(% change in number of employed residents, by neighborhood) 
 
Neighborhood % change 
1970-1980 
 
% change 
1980-1990 
% change 
1990-2000 
% change 
1970-2000 
City of Milwaukee Enterprise 
Community 
-34.0 -27.5 -8.1 -56.0 
Fond du Lac Corridor -9.9 -9.2 -14.9 -30.4 
King Drive District -44.1 -30.1 -6.3 -63.4 
27th and North Area -29.6 -37.7 -16.8 -63.5 
Northwest Side (extended) +31.9 +3.3 -11.4 +20.7 
 
 
Table 17: 
 
When Work AND Population Disappear II: 
 
The declining number of employed residents living in 
Milwaukees NSP Areas Since 1970 
 
(% change in number of employed residents, by neighborhood) 
 
NSP 
# 
 Neighborhood 
 
% change 
1970-1980 
% change 
1980-1990 
% change 
1990-2000 
% change 
1970-2000 
 
1 Parklawn -4.5 -9.1 -16.0 -27.0 
2 Northwest -7.2 0.0 16.8 -22.8 
3 Lincoln Park -16.8 +4.2 -23.5 -33.6 
4 United Community -14.8 -13.0 -27.0 -45.9 
5 Sherman Park -4.2 +4.1 -10.5 -10.8 
6 Harambee -34.9 -14.9 -13.5 -52.1 
7 Riverwest -12.8 +1.2 -3.5 -14.9 
8 Metcalfe Park -21.2 -26.8 -19.1 -53.3 
9 Midtown -27.2 -34.7 -19.9 -61.9 
10 Waico/YMCA -43.6 -27.8 -20.8 -67.8 
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill -21.3 -30.3 -14.1 -52.9 
12 Mid-Town -30.7 -31.7 -10.2 -57.5 
13 Hillside/Lapham -11.0 -30.8 +32.3 -18.4 
14 West Side -27.3 -9.3 -5.0 -27.8 
15 Greater Clarke Square -7.8 -1.0 -2.5 -11.0 
16 Near South Side -8.3 +2.7 +18.5 -6.1 
17 Historic South Side -8.3 +2.7 -10.4 -15.5 
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Tables 16 and 17 show how the twin trends of demographic decline and job loss 
have undercut the place of work in Milwaukee’s inner city. Between 1970-2000, the 
number of employed residents of Milwaukee’s “Enterprise Community” fell by a 
staggering 56 percent; in neighborhoods such as 27th and North and King Drive (which 
are located within the “Enterprise Community”), the number of employed residents fell 
by over 63 during the same period. Even during the 1990s, as America enjoyed eight 
years of uninterrupted economic growth, most Milwaukee inner city neighborhoods 
experienced double-digit declines in the number of employed residents. Once again, the 
raw figures are stark. In the census tracts around 27th and North, for example, the number 
of employed residents dropped from 7,005 in 1970 to 2,557 in 2000; the number of 
employed males living in the neighborhood dropped from 4,121 to 1,081 (a mind-
boggling 73.7 percent decline). Even during the 1990s, after having absorbed a huge 
decline (64.0 percent) between 1970-1990, the number of employed male residents in the 
27th Street and North Avenue Area declined by another 27.1 percent. In short, the 
combination of demographic decline and shrinking levels of labor force participation has, 
in every decade since 1970, reduced the number of employed residents in Milwaukee’s 
inner city.  
 
IV. 
 
Income and Poverty in Milwaukees Inner City 
 
 Milwaukee’s inner city neighborhoods, like such neighborhoods across the 
country, are the poorest areas of the city. Tables 18-21 provide data on trends in poverty 
in Milwaukee’s inner city neighborhoods since 1969. Tables 18 and 19 show the 
proportion of all residents of inner city neighborhoods living in poverty between 1969-
1999; tables 20 and 21 show the percentage of families living below the poverty line. 
 As the tables graphically reveal, no matter which measure is used, poverty has 
grown substantially in Milwaukee’s inner city since 1970. Without question, the 1980s –
when deindustrialization hit Milwaukee with full force and unemployment surged-- was a 
decade nothing short of economically devastating for Milwaukee’s inner city. In the 
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census tracts constituting the city’s “Enterprise Community,” the poverty rate for 
individuals increased between 1979-1999 from 36.9 to 57.1 percent. By 1989, nine of the 
city’s “NSP” Areas had individual poverty rates above 40 percent (up from only one in 
1979). Researchers generally use the “40 percent” threshold to identify “high poverty” 
areas. 
 
Table 18: 
Poverty in Milwaukees Inner City I: Individual Poverty 
% of persons in selected neighborhoods living below 
the federal poverty line, 1969-1999  
 
Neighborhood 1969 1979 1989 1999 
 
City of Milwaukee 
Enterprise Community 
29.3 36.9 57.1 44.3 
Fond du Lac Corridor 15.0 21.1 33.6 29.7 
King Drive District 33.8 39.3 58.6 50.0 
27th and North Area 24.2 39.1 56.7 47.6 
Northwest Side (extended) 5.8 7.5 13.3 20.9 
City of Milwaukee (entire) 11.2 13.4 22.1 21.3 
Metro Milwaukee 12.7 8.1 11.6 10.6 
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Table 19: 
Poverty in Milwaukees Inner City II: Individual Poverty 
%  of persons in NSP Areas living below 
the federal poverty line, 1969-1999 
 
 NSP # 
 
 Neighborhood 
 
1969 
 
1979 
 
1989 
 
1999 
 
1 Parklawn 16.8 14.4 28.0 36.1
2 Northwest 5.8 8. 22.5 25.9
3 Lincoln Park 4.4 11.5 19.5 20.9
4 United Community 16.5 23.5 35.1 33.9
5 Sherman Park 5.4 8.1 19.0 18.8
6 Harambee 25.6 35.4 50.3 42.5
7 Riverwest 14.0 14.2 25.8 24.9
8 Metcalfe Park 16.3 31.4 53.3 45.1
9 Midtown 25.7 35.8 52.6 50.1
10 Waico/YMCA 32.6 39.4 54.1 41.1
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 14.0 29.4 56.1 48.3
12 Mid-Town 30.8 36.7 55.8 45.6
13 Hillside/Lapham 63.0 48.2 75.1 56.3
14 West Side 23.3 30.6 49.0 40.7
15 Greater Clarke Square 8.9 12.8 25.3 25.3
16 Near South Side 17.5 21.2 43.6 34.4
17 Historic South Side 10.0 12.9 20.6 26.8
 
Table 20: 
Poverty in Milwaukees Inner City III: Family Poverty 
%  of families in selected neighborhoods living below 
the federal poverty line, 1969-1999  
 
Neighborhood 1969 1979 1989 1999 
 
City of Milwaukee 
Enterprise Community 
25.7 35.4 55.0 40.2 
Fond du Lac Corridor 11.8 19.3 31.0 26.6 
King Drive District 28.9 37.0 56.0 45.2 
27th and North Area 21.6 39.3 53.7 43.4 
Northwest Side (extended) 5.1 6.5 11.6 18.0 
City of Milwaukee (entire) 8.1 11.3 18.5 17.4 
Metro Milwaukee 5.7 6.2 8.9 7.7 
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Table 21: 
Poverty in Milwaukees Inner City IV: Family Poverty 
%  of persons in NSP Areas living below 
the federal poverty line, 1969-1999 
 
 NSP # 
 
 Neighborhood 
 
1969 
 
1979 
 
1989 
 
1999 
 
1 Parklawn 14.7 14.3 31.6 33.9
2 Northwest 4.1 7.3 20.4 23.3
3 Lincoln Park 3.9 9.1 16.0 17.2
4 United Community 13.9 23.2 33.6 30.6
5 Sherman Park 3.6 7.2 17.9 16.6
6 Harambee 21.8 35.4 49.5 38.2
7 Riverwest 10.4 13.1 23.3 22.5
8 Metcalfe Park 13.9 31.9 50.2 41.9
9 Midtown 23.5 35.9 49.3 47.9
10 Waico/YMCA 30.5 36.3 51.0 34.7
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 11.0 27.2 52.2 45.6
12 Mid-Town 27.5 35.2 54.4 41.5
13 Hillside/Lapham 61.4 48.6 77.0 55.4
14 West Side 13.0 24.4 45.0 35.5
15 Greater Clarke Square 6.2 11.9 22.6 21.3
16 Near South Side 12.7 20.5 38.9 32.1
17 Historic South Side 8.0 10.8 19.6 23.1
 
 
 During the 1990s, however, there was a marked improvement in poverty rates in 
Milwaukee’s inner city neighborhoods. The individual poverty rate fell in the city’s 
“Enterprise Community” from 57.1 to 44.3 percent during the decade (a 22 percent 
decline in the rate). Although poverty still remains unacceptably high in most inner city 
neighborhoods –seven of the city’s “NSP” areas still registered poverty rates above 40 
percent in 1999-- in 12 of the city’s 17 NSP areas during the 1990s, poverty declined.  
 Nevertheless, as welcome as these reductions in poverty rates in the past decade 
have been, they unfortunately do not necessarily indicate major gains in economic 
opportunity for inner city residents during the 1990s. For example, as Table 18 reveals, 
while poverty declined in the “Enterprise Community” during the 1990s, it surged from 
13.6 percent to 20.3 on Milwaukee’s Northwest Side, as “inner city-conditions” spread 
north and west from the old “inner core.” The number of poor residents also increased in 
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neighborhoods such as “NSP 17” (the Historic South Side) and “NSP 15 (Greater Clarke 
Square), as poor residents left “gentrifying” census tracts in Walker’s Point on the Near 
South Side. Moreover, an undetermined number of poor residents simply left the city 
entirely. Tellingly, despite the sharp fall in poverty in the “Enterprise Community” during 
the 1990s, in the city of Milwaukee as a whole, the individual poverty rate declined only 
slightly, from 22.1 to 21.3 percent. Thus, at least in part, the apparent decline in poverty 
in Milwaukee’s inner city in the 1990s represented more of a “geographical rearranging” 
of poverty in the city –a “displacement of the poor”-- than a lifting of many inner city 
residents out of poverty. Table 22 shows how the decrease in poverty in the “Enterprise 
Community” was accompanied by gains in poverty in other neighborhoods adjacent to 
the “original” inner city.   
  As Paul Jargowsky has documented,14 poverty rates exploded in 
Milwaukee’s inner city between 1970-1990, in part because the outmigration of “non-
poor” residents from many census tracts left a growing concentration of poor in an 
expanding “ghetto.” Many “borderline” census tracts near Milwaukee’s original north-
side “ghetto,” for example, with poverty rates between 20-40 percent in 1980, saw their 
poverty rates zoom above 40 percent by 1990 as non-poor residents moved out, leaving 
behind high concentrations of poor residents and spatially expanding the inner city. 
 
Table 22 
The Changing Geography of Poverty in Milwaukee, 1990-2000 
Changes in the number of poor residents in selected neighborhoods 
 
 
 
Neighborhood 
# of poor 
residents 1990 
# of poor 
residents 
2000 
change in 
number 
of poor 
residents 
% change 
in # of 
poor, 
1990-
2000 
 
 “Enterprise Community” 35,761 21,090 -14,671 -41.0 % 
Northwest Side (extended) 6,965 11,391 +4,426 +63.5% 
Historic South Side 5,645 7,900 +2,255 +39.9% 
Greater Clarke Square 7,670 8,499 +829 +10.8 % 
City of Milwaukee (entire) 135,585 123,664 -11,921 -8.8 % 
                                                 
14 Jargowsky, Poverty and Place, pp. 49-57. 
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Between 1990-2000, however, Milwaukee’s inner city expanded geographically 
in a different way. Poor residents began leaving the “extreme poverty” neighborhoods of 
the inner city, reducing the poverty rates in these neighborhoods, though not enough to 
change their character as high-poverty areas. The “Enterprise Community’s poverty rate, 
for example, remained well above the high poverty threshold of 40 percent in 1999. 
However, the movement of these poor residents to other areas of Milwaukee spatially 
expanded “inner city” poverty. Thus, for example, the number of census tracts on the 
Northwest Side with poverty rates above 20 percent grew from three in 1990 to six in 
1999. One tract on the Northwest Side registered a poverty rate of 47.8 percent in 1999. 
Table 23 shows, for key neighborhoods, how population flows, more than an 
actual reduction in inner city poverty, may explain the lion’s share of shifts in 
neighborhood poverty rates in Milwaukee during the 1990s. In general, if a 
neighborhood’s poverty rate changes through the migration of poor people either in or 
out of the area, we would expect to observe roughly equal changes in the neighborhood’s 
poor population and total population. Conversely, if the neighborhood poverty rate 
changes because people already living there become poorer (or less poor), the number of 
poor should change much more substantially than the population.15  
There does appear to be a very close match between changes in the total 
population and changes in the “poor” population in the neighborhoods arrayed in Table 
23. In the census tracts along King Drive, for example, the total population declined by 
1,305 residents between 1990-2000, while the number of poor residents fell by 1,156. Put 
another way, the drop in the number of poor residents constituted over 88 percent 
(1156/1305) of the “net decline” of population along King Drive. The end-result of these 
net movements of people (the balance of in-migrants and out-migrants) was a slight 
reduction in the neighborhood’s poverty rate (see table 18), although with a poverty rate 
of 50 percent in 1999, King Drive remains a “high poverty” neighborhood by any 
                                                 
15 There are limits to this approach. As Jargowsky points out, “[I]f the number of poor persons grew by one 
hundred in a census tract with a constant total population, the data do not indicate whether one hundred 
residents became poor or whether one hundred nonpoor persons left only to be replaced by an equal 
number of poor persons from elsewhere.” Jargowsky, Poverty and Place, p. 51. Nevertheless, matching 
population movements and poverty trends –while not conclusive—does give us a hint regarding the sources 
of changes in neighborhood poverty rates. 
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definition. By contrast, on the Northwest Side during the 1990s, the number of poor 
residents grew by 4,426, while total population increased by 2,125. Although we cannot 
tell with precision from the census data, these figures suggest that the inner city is 
expanding to the Northwest Side through a combination of: a) in-migration of poor 
residents, b) out-migration of non-poor residents, and c) impoverishment some 
individuals already living there. 
 
Table 23: 
Population Change and Neighborhood Poverty in the 1990s: 
The role of inter-neighborhood migration in shaping neighborhood poverty rates  
 
 
Neighborhood 
# of 
poor 
1990  
# of 
poor 
2000 
∆ 
1990-
2000 
% ∆ 
1990-
2000 
 
 total 
pop. 
1990 
total 
pop. 
2000 
∆ 
1990-
2000 
% ∆ 
1990-
2000 
“Enterprise Community” 35,761 21,090 -14,671 -41.0 %  62,629 47,608 -15,021 -24.0 % 
Fond du Lac Corridor 9,282 7,098 -2,184 -23.5 %  27,624 23,899 -3,725 -13.5 % 
27th St. and North Avenue 9,219 5,391 -3,828 -41.5 %  16,259 11,325 -4,934 -30.3 % 
King Drive District 3,434 2,278 -1,156 -33.7 %  5,861 4,556 -1,305 -22.3 % 
Northwest Side (extended) 6,965 11,391 +4,426 +41.6%  52,377 54,502 +2,125 + 4.1 % 
   
Tables 24-29 present data on household income trends in Milwaukee’s inner city 
since 1979.16 Between 1979-1999, median household income, adjusted for inflation, 
declined precipitously in every inner city neighborhood in Milwaukee.  Consequently, it 
is not surprising that real median household income for the city as a whole declined by 
12.4 percent during this period. As we have seen with other economic indicators, the 
bottom fell out household income in the inner city during the 1980s, as 
deindustrialization, rising unemployment, and persistent economic segregation devastated 
the inner city economy. Real median household income dropped a staggering 34.2 in the 
census tracts that would be later designated Milwaukee’s “Enterprise Community.” As 
                                                 
16 Unlike other indicators analyzed in this report, household income is available at the census tract level 
only back to the 1980 census. The 1970 census collected income data on “family income” and “per capita” 
income. Thus, for the purposes of data comparability, our analysis of household income trends extends 
back only to 1979. 
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table 28 shows, by 1989, median household income in the city’s “Enterprise Community” 
had fallen to under one-third (31.9 percent) of the metropolitan area’s median. Income 
rose sharply in the “Enterprise Community” during the 1990s (discussed below). 
Nevertheless, through 1999 median household income in this core area of Milwaukee’s 
inner city was only $18,193, less than 40 percent of the metropolitan area’s median (and 
less than 30 percent of the median household income in Milwaukee’s suburbs). 
Moreover, as we have seen with other indicators of economic well-being, 
precipitous real income declines occurred in neighborhoods such as the Northwest Side 
and Lincoln Park, including the “boom” decade of the 1990s, bringing “inner city” 
income-levels to these heretofore middle-class sections of Milwaukee. In 1979, median 
household income on the Northwest Side was almost identical to the metropolitan area 
median; by 1999, median household income on the Northwest Side had fallen to 74.6 
percent of the metro area median (see table 28). 
 
 
Table 24: 
Real Median Household Income in Milwaukees Inner City I, 1979-1999 
Median household income in selected neighborhoods, in 1999 dollars 
 
Neighborhood 1979 1989 1999 
 
City of Milwaukee 
Enterprise Community 
$21,090 $13,868 $18,193 
Fond du Lac Corridor $31,753 $27,348 $28,197 
King Drive District 19,341 13,187 18,543 
27th and North Area 21,160 15,398 19,344 
Northwest Side (extended) 45,309 38,756 34,229 
City of Milwaukee (entire) 36,781 31,744 32,216 
Metropolitan Milwaukee 46,123 43,418 45,901 
Milwaukee Suburbs 57,092 56,322 63,116  
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Table 25: 
Real Median Household Income in Milwaukees Inner City II, 1979-1999 
Median household income in NSP areas, in 1999 dollars 
NSP 
# 
 Neighborhood 
 
1979 1989 1999 
 
1 Parklawn $32,533 $27,281 $27,230
2 Northwest 36,921 28,999 27,343
3 Lincoln Park 36,392 31,089 29,746
4 United Community 31,209 22,700 23,741
5 Sherman Park 39,199 34,739 34,210
6 Harambee 22,844 16,556 20,420
7 Riverwest 31,202 25,703 28,228
8 Metcalfe Park 26,247 17,378 20,177
9 Midtown 22,349 16,741 18,227
10 Waico/YMCA 21,457 15,274 17,348
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 28,808 17,726 19,960
12 Mid-Town 20,724 13,207 18,116
13 Hillside/Lapham 11,560 9,960 9,586
14 West Side 19,628 13,751 15,728
15 Greater Clarke Square 33,545 26,355 28,324
16 Near South Side 28,477 18,937 23,772
17 Historic South Side 33,079 28,172 28,457
 
 
 
Table 26: 
Changes in Median Household Income in Milwaukees Inner City I, 1979-1999 
 
(% change in median household income in selected  
inner city neighborhoods, in 1999 dollars) 
 
Neighborhood % change 
1979-1989 
% change 
1989-1999 
% change 
1979-1999 
 
City of Milwaukee Enterprise 
Community 
-34.2 +31.2 -13.7 
Fond du Lac Corridor -13.9 +3.1 -11.1 
King Drive District -31.8 +40.6 -4.1 
27th and North Area -27.2 +25.6 -8.6 
Northwest Side (extended) -14.5 -11.7 -24.4 
City of Milwaukee (entire) -13.7 +1.5 -12.4 
Metropolitan Milwaukee -5.9 +5.7 -0.5 
Milwaukee Suburbs -1.2 +12.1 +10.7 
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Table 27: 
Changes in Median Household Income in Milwaukees Inner City II, 1979-1999 
 
(% change in median household income “NSP” Areas, in 1999 dollars) 
 
NSP 
# 
 Neighborhood 
 
1979-1989 1989-1999 1979-1999
 
1 Parklawn -16.1 -0.2 -16.3
2 Northwest -21.5 -5.7 -25.9
3 Lincoln Park -14.6 -4.3 -18.2
4 United Community -27.3 +4.6 -23.9
5 Sherman Park -11.4 -1.5 -12.7
6 Harambee -27.5 +23.3 -10.6
7 Riverwest -17.6 +9.8 -9.5
8 Metcalfe Park -33.8 +16.1 -23.1
9 Midtown -25.1 +8.9 -18.4
10 Waico/YMCA -28.8 +13.5 -19.1
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill -40.0 +15.5 -30.7
12 Mid-Town -36.2 +37.2 -12.5
13 Hillside/Lapham -13.6 -4.0 -17.0
14 West Side -29.9 +14.3 -19.9
15 Greater Clarke Square -21.4 +7.5 -15.6
16 Near South Side -33.5 +25.5 -16.5
17 Historic South Side -14.8 +1.0 -14.0
 
 
Table 28: 
Income in the Inner City Compared to the Rest of the Region I 
Median Household Income in selected areas as % of metropolitan 
Milwaukee median household income, 1979-1999 
 
Neighborhood 1979 1989 1999 
 
Enterprise Community 45.8 31.9 39.6 
Fond du Lac Corridor 68.8 63.0 61.4 
King Drive District 41.9 30.3 40.4 
27th and North Area 45.9 35.5 42.1 
Northwest Side (extended) 98.2 89.3 74.6 
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Table 29: 
Income in the Inner City Compared to the Rest of the Region II 
Median Household Income in NSP Areas as % of metropolitan 
Milwaukee median household income, 1979-1999 
 
NSP 
# 
 Neighborhood 
 
1979 1989 1999 
 
1 Parklawn 70.5 62.8 59.3
2 Northwest 80.0 66.8 59.6
3 Lincoln Park 78.9 71.6 64.8
4 United Community 67.7 52.3 51.7
5 Sherman Park 85.0 80.0 74.5
6 Harambee 49.5 38.1 44.4
7 Riverwest 67.6 59.2 61.5
8 Metcalfe Park 56.9 40.0 44.0
9 Midtown 48.5 38.6 39.7
10 Waico/YMCA 46.5 35.2 37.8
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 62.5 39.8 43.5
12 Mid-Town 44.9 30.4 39.5
13 Hillside/Lapham 25.0 23.0 20.9
14 West Side 42.6 31.7 34.3
15 Greater Clarke Square 72.7 60.7 61.7
16 Near South Side 61.7 43.6 51.7
17 Historic South Side 71.7 64.9 62.0
 
 
 The income gains posted in many inner city neighborhoods during the 1990s 
appear, at first glance, to be impressive. Median household income, adjusted for inflation, 
rose 31.2 percent in the city’s “Enterprise Community,” 25.6 percent in the neighborhood 
around 27th Street and North Avenue, and a whopping 40.6 percent in the census tracts 
along King Drive. Eleven of the city’s “NSP” areas registered an increase in real median 
household income, led by a 37.2 surge in the Mid-Town neighborhood.  
 In the aftermath of the neighborhood income meltdown of the 1980s, any increase 
in neighborhood income is good news for Milwaukee –even if the gains by the end of the 
1990s still left every inner city neighborhood in the city well behind income levels of 
1979 (see tables 26-27).  However, the inner city income gains of the 1990s are 
deceptive. After all, real household income grew by just 1.5 percent for the city of 
Milwaukee as a whole during the 1990s; thus, if income went up by 31.2 percent in the 
“Enterprise Zone” during the decade, it was crashing in other areas of the city. This was, 
in fact, the case, as median household income declined a substantial 11.7 percent –after 
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inflation—in the census tracts of the Northwest corner of Milwaukee. Rather than 
representing rising incomes for poor residents of Milwaukee’s inner city neighborhoods 
during the 1990s, rising median income figures in inner city neighborhoods more likely 
reflected the “geographical rearrangement” of poverty discussed earlier in this report. 
Median household income rose in inner city neighborhoods chiefly because many poor 
households left and a few more affluent households moved in. Conversely, in 
neighborhoods such as the Northwest Side, a heavy influx of poor households, and a 
modest out-migration of middle class households, caused real median household income 
to plummet in the 1990s. Put another way, the income gains of the “Enterprise 
Community” were matched by income declines on the Northwest Side, leaving the inner 
city as a whole with minimal income growth in the 1990s. The changing real income 
figures for Milwaukee’s inner city reflect more a “dispersal of poverty” in the city17, 
along with some pockets of gentrification in the inner city, as opposed to major 
improvements in economic opportunity for residents of the inner city. 
 Tables 30-34 show, for selected inner city neighborhoods, how the out-migration 
or in-migration of mainly low-income households, rather than broadly rising resident 
incomes, appears to account for the lion’s share of inner city neighborhood income shifts 
in Milwaukee during the 1990s. In the city’s “Enterprise Community,” for example, there 
was a net loss of 3,826 households during the 1990s – over one-fifth of the area’s 
households. Almost all of this net loss can be attributed to changes in the number of low-
income households. Between 1989-1999 in “the Enterprise Community,” there was a net 
loss of 3,850 households with annual incomes below $20,000 (in 1999 dollars) –slightly 
greater, even, than the net decline in the number of all households in the area.18 The 
“Enterprise Community” also experienced gentrification around Brewers Hill and 
Walkers Point during the 1990s, and the growth of very small pockets of more affluent 
households in areas around 27th and North and along King Drive. During the 1990s, the 
“Enterprise Community” registered a net gain of 349 households with annual income 
above $50,000 (with an increase of 263 households in the “over $100,000” category 
                                                 
17 As noted earlier, an undetermined number of these poor households moved out of the city entirely. 
18 The same relationship between the decline in the number of low-income households and the decrease in 
the total number of households is apparent in neighborhoods such as King Drive and 27th St. and North 
Avenue, which are located within the “Enterprise Community.” See tables 31-32. 
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alone). While this gentrification certainly helped boost median household income during 
the 1990s in the “Enterprise Community,” the data strongly suggest that the most 
important cause of rising median income in the neighborhood was the massive out-
migration of low-income households. Although some neighborhood residents 
undoubtedly saw their incomes increase during the 1990s19, the “displacement of the 
poor” –not a “rising tide” of income growth “lifting” all neighborhood households—was 
the primary cause of rising median income in Milwaukee’s “Enterprise Community.” 
 On the other hand, as table 34 strongly suggests, an influx of low-income 
households combined with an out-migration of middle-class households seems to have 
been at work in the 1990s in producing the sharp drop in median household income in the 
city’s sprawling Northwest Side neighborhoods. There was a net increase of 175 
households on the Northwest Side during the 1990s; essentially, a gain of 935 low-
income households, and 351 “moderate income” households,20 was counterbalanced by a 
net drop of 1,111 households with annual income above $50,000. But, the end-result of 
these two flows was to sharply bring down median income in the neighborhood and, as 
we have noted earlier, expand Milwaukee’s inner city economy to the northwest. 
Table 30: 
Net Household Movements and Neighborhood Income  
in the 1990s: The Enterprise Community 
(in 1999 constant dollars) 
 
Annual Household 
Income Ranges 
 
# of households 
1989 
# of households 
1999 
change, 1989-
1999 
<$20,000 11,817 7,967 -3,850 
$20,000 to $49,999 5,076 4,751 -325 
$50,000 to $99,999 1,514 1,600 +86 
>$100,000 82 345 +263 
Total Households 18,489 14,663 -3,826 
 
                                                 
19 However, the data on labor force exclusion presented earlier, as well as other indicators suggest that such 
gains were probably very limited during the 1990s. According to HUD, Milwaukee was one of the few 
large cities in the United States (along with Buffalo, Cleveland, and Philadelphia) to actually lose jobs 
during the “roaring” 1990s (a net decline of 1804 jobs between 1991-1999). See the forthcoming report by 
the Center for Economic Development, The Economic State of Milwaukee: The City and the Region, 2002.  
20 The gain in “moderate income” households on the Northwest Side actually skews more toward the lower-
end of the income range. The neighborhood had a net increase of 351 households in the $20,000-$49,999 
range; 315 of these households had annual incomes of $20,000-$30,000.   
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Table 31: 
Net Household Movements and Neighborhood Income  
in the 1990s: the 27th Street and North Avenue Area 
(in 1999 constant dollars) 
 
Annual Household 
Income Ranges 
 
# of households 
1989 
# of households 
1999 
change, 1989-
1999 
<$20,000 2,452 1,628 -824 
$20,000 to $49,999 1,467 1,030 -437 
$50,000 to $99,999 361 422 +61 
>$100,000 6 76 +70 
Total Households 4,286 3,156 -1,130 
 
Table 32: 
Net Household Movements and Neighborhood Income  
in the 1990s: the King Drive District 
(in 1999 constant dollars) 
 
Annual Household 
Income Ranges 
 
# of households 
1989 
# of households 
1999 
change, 1989-
1999 
<$20,000 1,267 805 -462 
$20,000 to $49,999 498 468 -30 
$50,000 to $99,999 158 155 -3 
>$100,000 10 80 +70 
Total Households 1,933 1,508 -425 
 
 
Table 33: 
Net Household Movements and Neighborhood Income  
in the 1990s: the Fond du Lac Avenue Corridor 
(in 1999 constant dollars) 
 
Annual Household 
Income Ranges 
 
# of households 
1989 
# of households 
1999 
change, 1989-
1999 
<$20,000 3,445 2,921 -524 
$20,000 to $49,999 3,637 3,089 -548 
$50,000 to $99,999 1,727 1,594 -133 
>$100,000 186 354 +168 
Total Households 8,995 7,958 -1037 
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Table 34: 
Net Household Movements and Neighborhood Income  
in the 1990s: the Northwest Side (extended) 
(in 1999 constant dollars) 
 
Annual Household 
Income Ranges 
 
# of households 
1989 
# of households 
1999 
change, 1989-
1999 
<$20,000 4,906 5,841 +935 
$20,000 to $49,999 8,739 9,090 +351 
$50,000 to $99,999 6,455 5,055 -1400 
>$100,000 612 901 +289 
Total Households 20,722 20,887 +175 
  
 In sum, the data on income and poverty trends reveal nothing like the inner city 
“rich in opportunity” that Milwaukee city officials and flawed research reports have 
trumpeted in recent years. The 1980s were a particularly devastating decade for 
Milwaukee’s inner city, as incomes plummeted and poverty soared. But, despite some 
very modest gains during a decade of almost continuous national economic expansion 
(the 1990s), incomes remain low and poverty remains high in the inner city.21  During the 
1990s, there were sharp increases in income and declines in poverty in most 
neighborhoods of the inner city. But, as we examined, these improvements were less 
indicative of an inner city “renaissance” than of an “expanding inner city” as poor 
families and individuals dispersed to neighborhoods such as the Northwest Side. 
Consequently, notwithstanding the boom of the nineties, real income and poverty rates 
barely budged for the city of Milwaukee as a whole. Inner city income lags far behind the 
rest of metropolitan Milwaukee, and poverty remains significantly higher than elsewhere 
in the region. Pockets of gentrification did emerge in inner city census tracts during the 
1990s, a positive and important economic development. But, on the whole, the indicators 
of income and poverty tell a story of continuing economic crisis in Milwaukee’s inner 
city.  
 
 
                                                 
21 One wonders, given these modest gains in the midst of an almost decade-long economic boom, what 
effect the 2000-2001 recession will have had on inner city incomes and poverty rates.  
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V. 
Creating Urban Legends:  
The Myth of Inner City Purchasing Power and Untapped Markets 
 
Despite the low incomes and high poverty in Milwaukee’s inner city, city officials 
and supportive researchers have argued vociferously in recent years that the inner city is 
ripe for economic development. Following Michael Porter’s influential work,22 city 
officials maintain that although incomes may be relatively low in the inner city, the 
population density of inner city neighborhoods produces surprisingly high aggregate 
incomes and aggregate purchasing power. As a result, claim proponents of this argument, 
the inner city has a “competitive advantage” in attracting businesses, particularly retail 
establishments drawn to dense consumer markets. The City of Milwaukee now posts on 
its web site “purchasing power profiles” for inner city zip codes, prepared by the UWM 
Employment and Training Institute, detailing the aggregate purchasing power of inner 
city neighborhoods. The ETI tables also offer comparisons with selected Milwaukee 
suburbs, to “demonstrate” that the purchasing power in inner city neighborhoods is 
purportedly greater than in prosperous Milwaukee suburbs such as Brookfield or Franklin 
(and thus presumably we should infer that business development opportunities are 
superior in the inner city). 
 This analysis is misleading, conceptually and empirically. Declining real income 
coupled with the demographic “hollowing out” since the late 1970s has meant that real 
aggregate income and real aggregate purchasing power have declined precipitously over 
the past twenty years in the inner city. As table 35 shows, between 1979-1999, aggregate 
household income, adjusted for inflation, declined by 32.5 percent in the census tracts of 
the “Enterprise Community”; for most inner city neighborhoods, the decline since 1979 
has been well above 20 percent. Thus, the “competitive advantage” argument is 
conceptually flawed on its face: aggregate purchasing power in the inner city was 
substantially higher in the 1970s than it is today, and population density was significantly 
greater. Yet disinvestment, retail decline, and commercial abandonment all accelerated in 
                                                 
22 See Porter’s seminal article, “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” Harvard Business Review 
(May-June 1995): 55-71 
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the 1970s and 1980s. If aggregate purchasing power were a crucial factor in investment 
or development decisions, the inner city would have been a much more “competitive” 
place in 1979 than it is today, and would have had even greater advantages over suburbs 
than it does today. Manifestly, advantages in density and aggregate purchasing power did 
not generate a surge in inner city economic development in the 1970s or 1980s; why 
should those factors, all greatly reduced since the 1970s, result in a “competitive 
advantage” today? As Merrill Goozner puts it in his trenchant critique of “market-driven” 
inner city economic development: “If cities do have latent competitive advantages…the 
market has spectacularly failed to grasp them in recent years.”23 
The decline in inner city real aggregate income slowed in the 1990s (chiefly 
because the out-migrants from the inner city were very poor and the in-migrants were  
 
Table 35: 
Trends in Aggregate Household Income in  
Milwaukees Inner City 
 
(% change in real aggregate household income in selected neighborhoods) 
 
Neighborhood % change 
1979-1989 
% change 
1989-1999 
% change 
1979-1999 
 
City of Milwaukee 
“Enterprise Community” 
-33.9 +2.0 -32.5 
Fond du Lac Corridor -18.5 -1.0 -19.3 
King Drive District -27.7 +17.5 -15.0 
27th and North Area 35.3 +5.7 -31.6 
Northwest Side (extended) -2.2 -3.6 -5.8 
City of Milwaukee (entire) -18.9 +7.5 -12.8 
Metropolitan Milwaukee -2.5 +34.5 +31.1 
Milwaukee Suburbs +7.1 +48.8 +62.4 
 
more affluent); in some neighborhoods, such as the “Enterprise Community,” there was a 
modest increase in real aggregate household income. Nevertheless, at the same time inner  
city aggregate income was plummeting in the 1980s and stagnating in the 1990s, real 
aggregate household income skyrocketed in Milwaukee suburbs (as population and 
household incomes soared). Even during the 1990s, when real aggregate household 
                                                 
23 Merrill Goozner, “The Porter Prescription,” The American Prospect, 9:38 (May-June 1998): 60. 
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income in the “Enterprise Community” nudged upward by 2.0 percent, real income in the 
suburbs went up by 48.8 percent. Between 1979-99, as real aggregate income in the 
“Enterprise Community” plummeted by 32.5 percent, it surged by 62.4 percent in 
Milwaukee’s suburbs. Thus as tables 35-37 illustrate, real aggregate household income in 
Milwaukee’s inner city declined in both absolute and relative terms in the 1980s and 
1990s, which doubly disadvantaged these neighborhoods in attracting businesses. 
Retailers, looking for the most robust and expanding consumer markets, will be drawn to 
“where the money is,” and that has been suburbia in metropolitan Milwaukee for at least 
the past quarter century. In Franklin, a suburb that the ETI “purchasing power profiles” 
compare unfavorably to Milwaukee’s inner city, real aggregate income rose 70.9 percent 
during the 1990s, compared to the 0.4 percent increase in all of Milwaukee’s 17 NSP 
Areas” combined (see table 37). Is it any surprise, therefore, that the number of retail  
 
Table 36: 
Trends in Aggregate Household Income in  
Milwaukees Inner City 
 
(% change in real aggregate household income in “NSP” Areas) 
 
 NSP # 
 
 
 NEIGHBORHOOD 
 
 
% change 
1979-89 
 
 
% change 
1989-99 
 
 
% change 
1979-1999 
 
 
1 Parklawn -20.7   -2.1 -21.6
2 Northwest -16.7 -4.6 -20.5
3 Lincoln Park -13.3 +4.2 -9.7
4 United Community -25.6 -2.1 -27.1
5 Sherman Park -11.3 -0.5 -11.7
6 Harambee -20.5 -1.0 -21.2
7 Riverwest -8.0 +1.6 -6.5
8 Metcalfe Park -34.2 -0.6 -34.6
9 Midtown -32.5 -2.6 -34.2
10 WAICO/YMCA -37.0 -6.5 -41.1
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill -35.1 -10.0 -41.6
12 Mid-Town -37.6 +0.5 -37.2
13 Hillside/Lapham -33.2 -3.8 -35.7
14 West Side -24.2 -0.3 -24.4
15 Greater Clarke Square -16.1 +5.7 -11.4
16 Near South Side -28.5 +17.0 -16.5
17 Historic South Side -7.3 +1.2 -6.1
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Table 37: 
The Purchasing Power Advantage of the Inner City? 
 
Trends in Aggregate Household Income in Selected 
Metro Milwaukee Communities, 1979-1999 
 
(% change in real aggregate household income) 
 
Community % change, 
1979-89 
% change, 
1989-99 
% change, 
1979-99 
Brookfield +29.8 +23.6 +60.7
Franklin +41.2 +70.9 +141.3
Germantown +45.0 +51.9 +120.3
Menomonee Falls +6.1 +43.2 +51.9
New Berlin +25.1 +38.5 +73.3
Oak Creek +21.9 +72.9 +110.0
Enterprise Community -33.9 +2.0 -32.5
All NSP Areas Combined  -20.5 +0.4 -20.2
 
establishments in Franklin grew by 16.1 percent between 1994-99, while declining by 
14.0 percent in Milwaukee’s inner city? (See table 39). 
 Tables 38 and 39 graphically illustrate how these trends in income and purchasing 
power –as well as the other indicators examined in this study—translated into economic 
“performance measures” in the 1990s. If, as city officials and their research associates 
suggest, market-driven recognition of “untapped purchasing power” is driving an inner 
city economic revival, there is little evidence in the indicators arrayed here. 
Table 39 is particularly revealing, in light of the explicit efforts by city officials and their 
research associates to tout the “purchasing power advantages” of the inner city over 
Milwaukee’s suburbs. On every indicator, this sampling of suburban communities 
exhibited much higher levels of economic dynamism in the late 1990s –as the national 
economic boom reached its apex—than did Milwaukee’s inner city. Business activity, 
measured by the number of business establishments, actually declined in the inner city 
during the height of the economic boom, while the number of retail establishments –
supposedly drawn by the inner city’s “purchasing power”—fell by 14.0 percent between 
1994-99. Employment remained essentially unchanged in the inner city, despite massive 
growth elsewhere, while payroll increases in inner city workplaces lagged far behind the 
suburban averages. What’s worse, this decline in business activity and employment 
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stagnation in the inner city occurred during the peak of the 1990s business cycle; in the 
aftermath of the 2000-2001 recession, one wonders what the economic data will reveal 
about the “competitive advantages” of the inner city economy. 
Table 38: 
The Inner City in the Roaring Nineties, Snapshot I 
 
Economic Indicators in the Inner City compared 
to the rest of Metro Milwaukee, 1994-1999 
 
Indicator Inner City Milwaukee 
County 
Metro 
Milwaukee  
* 
WOW 
Suburbs** 
% change, # of business 
establishments 
-9.1 -3.2 +3.8 +13.3
% change, # of retail 
establishments 
-14.0 -8.8 -2.2 +10.0
% change, total 
employment 
+0.2 +1.9 +9.0 +22.2
% change, annual 
payroll (constant 1999$) 
+4.9 +12.9 +21.1 +39.1
*Four-county metropolitan area; **Waukesha, Ozaukee, and Washington Cos. 
 
Table 39: 
 
The Inner City in the Roaring Nineties, Snapshot II 
 
Economic Indicators in the Inner City compared 
to selected other communities in 
metropolitan area, 1994-1999 
 
 
Indicator  
Inner 
City 
Brookfield 
 
Franklin 
 
German
town 
 
New 
Berlin 
Oak 
Creek 
Ocono-
mowoc 
Pewaukee 
% change, # of 
business establishmts 
-9.1 +14.2 +23.5 +24.3 +9.8 +20.7 +12.0 +45.6 
% change, # of retail 
establishments 
-14.0 +20.3 +16.1 +38.6 +21.1 +11.0 -11.4 +60.9 
% change, total 
employment 
+0.2 +26.1 +54.0 +37.4 +18.6 +27.2 +27.4 +55.4 
% change, annual 
payroll (constant 
1999$) 
+4.9 +45.1 +71.0 +53.0 +23.6 +34.3 +41.8 +84.0 
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VI. 
Conclusion 
 
Those claiming to “expose urban legends” should be careful about creating new 
ones. The portrait of an inner city economy pulsing with opportunity may be good public 
relations for city hall, but it distorts the realities of neighborhood economic life in 
Milwaukee.  As we have seen in this report, Milwaukee’s inner city has experienced a 
grim thirty-year period of economic decline since 1970, and, despite the national 
economic boom, the inner city economic problems persisted through the 1990s.  As we 
begin the 21st century, a cluster of daunting issues face policymakers seeking strategies to 
revive inner city neighborhoods and improve economic opportunities for residents: 
• A demographic “hollowing out,” in which, during the 1990s alone, the 
population in the city’s “Enterprise Community” dropped by 24 percent; 
• A labor market in which disappearing industrial jobs have not been replaced, 
where unemployment remains four times higher than the metro area average, 
and where over half the working age male population is out of work; 
• Persistent poverty, in which the poverty rate in neighborhoods such as King 
Drive remained five times the metro area average in 1999 (and declined in the 
1990s only because of the massive out-migration of poor residents);  
• Spreading poverty, in which “inner city conditions” expanded to 
neighborhoods such as the Northwest Side during the 1990s; 
• Real median household income that remains, in the city’s “Enterprise 
Community,” 13.7 percent below its 1979 level, lags far behind the metro area 
average, and increased during the 1990s in certain neighborhoods (like King 
Drive) only because of massive out-migration by poor households. In other 
neighborhoods, such as the Northwest Side, incomes fell sharply in the 1990s 
as the number of poor residents increased; 
• Declining indicators of economic activity, such as the number of business 
establishments or retail establishments, even during the peak of the national 
economic boom (1994-99. Other indicators, such as employment and annual 
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payroll, registered modest gains in the inner city during the late 1990s, but 
still lagged far behind the growth in business activity in the suburbs.   
 
Effective public policy requires a solid research base on which to base decisions. 
An accurate appraisal of conditions in Milwaukee’s inner city is a sine qua non to 
developing good strategies to meet the challenges facing these neighborhoods. The 
purpose of this report has been to provide a review of long-term trends in the inner city, 
to take particular stock of trends in the 1990s, and to offer some explanations behind the 
numbers.  The economic challenges facing Milwaukee’s inner city are daunting but not 
unsolvable, and clearly no issue is more important to the future of this city. If this report 
stimulates a comprehensive debate in the Milwaukee region about the state of the inner 
city and the need for new strategies for economic revitalization, it will have served its 
purpose.  
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Appendix 
 
Data was aggregated from the following census tracts to produce the 
neighborhood-level data presented for Milwaukee’s  inner city in this report: 
 
• City of Milwaukee Enterprise Community: 70, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 
88, 89, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 
120, 121, 122, 138, 139, 141, 142, 156, 157 
• Fond du Lac Avenue Corridor: 38, 39, 48, 49, 63, 88, 99, 100, 101 
• 27th Street and North Avenue Area: 87, 88, 97, 98, 99, 119, 120 
• King Drive District: 82, 83, 104, 105 
• Northwest Side (extended): 1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 29, 30 
• NSP #1-Parklawn: 27, 40 
• NSP #2-Northwest Side: 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28, 41 
• NSP #3-Lincoln Park: 22, 23 
• NSP#4-United Community: 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68 
• NSP#5-Sherman Park: 37, 38, 39, 48, 49, 50, 59, 60, 61, 62 
• NSP#6-Harambee: 44, 69, 70, 81, 82, 83, 104, 105, 106, 115 
• NSP#7-Riverwest: 44, 71, 72, 79, 80 
• NSP#8-Metcalfe Park: 62, 88, 89, 90, 98, 99 
• NSP#9-Midtown: 87, 88, 99, 100 
• NSP#10-WAICO/YMCA: 84, 85, 86, 101, 102, 103, 117, 118 
• NSP#11-Grandview/Walnut Hill: 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 122 
• NSP#12-Mid-Town: 99, 100, 119, 120, 121, 138, 139, 140 
• NSP#13-Hillside/Lapham: 116, 141 
• NSP#14-West Side: 123, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 
• NSP#15-Greater Clarke Square:158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 169, 170, 171 
• NSP#16-Near South Side: 155, 156, 157, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168 
• NSP#17-Historic South Side:: 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180.01, 
180.02, 186, 187, 188 
 47
Data was gathered on the following zip codes as inner city zip codes: 53204, 
53205, 53206, 5308, 53210, 53212, 53216, 53218, 53233 
 
 
